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Abstract
In this paper we develop the Generalise Taylor Economy (GTE)
in which there are many sectors with overlapping contracts of di⁄er-
ent lengths. We are able to show that even in economies with the
same average contract length, monetary shocks will be more persis-
tent when there are longer contracts. In particular we are able to
solve the puzzle of why Calvo contracts appear to be more persistent
than simple Taylor contracts: it is because the standard calibration of
Calvo contracts is not correct.
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"There is a great deal of heterogeneity in wage and price setting.
In fact, the data suggest that there is as much a di⁄erence between
the average lengths of di⁄erent types of price setting arrangements, or
between the average lengths of di⁄erent types of wage setting arrange-
ments, as there is between wage setting and price setting. Grocery
prices change much more frequently than magazine prices - frozen or-
ange juice prices change every two weeks, while magazine prices change
every three years! Wages in some industries change once per year on
average, while others change per quarter and others once every two
years. One might hope that a model with homogenous representative
price or wage setting would be a good approximation to this more
complex world, but most likely some degree of heterogeneity will be
required to describe reality accurately."
Taylor (1999).
There are two main approaches to modelling nominal wage and price
rigidity in the dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) macromodels: the stag-
gered contract setting of Taylor ( Taylor (1980)) and the Calvo model of
random contract lengths generated by a constant hazard (reset) probability
(Calvo (1983)). This paper proposes a generalization of the standard Taylor
model to allow for an economy with many di⁄erent contract lengths: we call
this a Generalized Taylor Economy - GTE for short. The standard approach
in the literature has been to adopt a simple Taylor economy, in which there
is a single contract length in the economy: for example 2 or 4 quarters1. As
the above quote from John Taylor indicates, in practice there is a wide range
of wage and price setting behavior resulting in a variety of contract lengths.
We can use the GTE framework to evaluate whether the hope expressed by
John Taylor that a representative sector approach "is a good approximation
to this more complex world".
An additional advantage of the GTE framework is that it includes the
Calvo model as a special case, in the sense that we can set up the GTE to
1This is not to ignore some recent papers that have allowed for two sectors with di⁄erent
contract durations, such as Aoki (2001), Erceg and Levin (2002), Carlstrom, Fuerst and
Ghironi (2003) or with multi-sectors such as Mankiw and Reis (2003). However, these
studies are mainly concerned with computing optimal monetary policy in a Dynamic
Equlibrium Setting.
2have the same distribution of contract lengths as the Calvo model. This is
an important contribution in itself since the two approaches have until now
appeared to be distinct and incompatible at the theoretical level even if they
are sometimes claimed to be empirically similar (see for example Kiley (2002)
for a discussion). As we shall show, a simple Taylor economy can indeed be
a good approximation to a Calvo model, but only if the two are calibrated
in a consistent manner.
We develop our approach in a DGE setting following the approach of
Ascari (2000). The issue we focus on is the way a monetary shock can
generate changes in output through time, and in particular the degree of
persistence of deviations of output from steady-state. Much recent attention
has been devoted to the ability of the staggered contract approach of Taylor
to generate enough persistence in the sense of being quantitatively able to
generate the persistence observed in the data. Two in￿ uential papers in this
are Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) and Ascari (2000). Both papers are
pessimistic for staggered contracts. CKM develop a microfounded model of
staggered price-setting and ￿nd that they do not generate enough persistence
and conclude that the ￿mechanism to solve persistence problem must be
found elsewhere". Ascari focusses on staggered wage setting, and ￿nds that
whilst nominal wage rigidities lead to more persistent output deviations than
with price setting, they are still not enough to explain the data. Based on
these conclusions, it is commonly inferred that in a dynamic equilibrium
framework, the staggered contracts cannot generate enough persistence.
In this paper, we follow Ascari in focussing on staggered wage-contracts.
However, we show that by allowing for an economy with a range of contract
lengths, the presence of longer contracts can signi￿cantly increase the degree
of persistence in output following a monetary shock. We calibrate the model
in a way that in either the CKM or Ascari setting would not generate much
persistence. We show that even a small proportion of longer contracts can
signi￿cantly increase the degree of persistence. For example, we consider
the case of a economy where 90% of the economy consist of simple 2-period
Taylor contracts, and 10% have 8-period Taylor contracts (the average is
2.6 quarters) and show that the economy has a marked increase in output
persistence. We also take an empirical distribution of contract lengths (from
1-8 quarters) for the US taken from Taylor (1993) and show that this will
generate a signi￿cant degree of persistence.
It has long been observed that in the Calvo setting there can be a sig-
ni￿cant backlog of old contracts: for example, with a reset probability of
3! = 0:25 (a common value used with quarterly data), there is a probability
of over 10% that a contract will survive for 8 periods (see for example Erceg
(1997), Wolman (1999)). We construct a GTE which has the same dis-
tribution of completed contract lengths as the Calvo distribution. We ￿nd
that this Calvo-GTE has almost exactly the same persistence as the Calvo
economy. This supports the idea that the persistence resulting from Calvo
contracts is explained by the presence of longer-term contracts. However,
it also shows that if we have the same distribution of contract lengths in a
GTE, the persistence is the same. This indicates that the two approaches
can be uni￿ed and are not so di⁄erent. We also show that the view that
Calvo is more persitent than the equivalent Taylor economy is based on a
mis-calibration and inconsistent basis of comparison. The Taylor case is
speci￿ed in terms of completed contract lengths: the Calvo is usually looked
at in terms of contract age, which is very di⁄erent from completed lifetime
of a contract. As we show in Dixon and Kara (2004), a reset probability of
! = 0:25 leads to an average contract lifetime of 7 periods, not 4: Hence
simple Taylor economies of 4 quarters should be compared with Calvo reset
probabilities of ! = 0:4 for mean contract length to be equated.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we outline the basic
structure of the Economy. The main innovation here is to allow for the
GTE contract structure. In section 3 we present the log-linearized general
equilibrium and discuss the calibration of the model in relation to recent
literature. In section 4 we explore the in￿ uence of longer term contracts on
persistence as compared to the simple Taylor economy, and in section 5 we
apply our methodology to evaluating persistence in the Calvo model.
2 The Model Economy
The approach of this paper is to model an economy in which there can
be many sectors with di⁄erent wage setting processes, which we denote a
generalized Taylor economy.(GTE). As we will show later, an advantage of
the GTE approach is that it includes as special cases not only the standard
Taylor case of an economy where all wage contracts are of the same length,
but also the Calvo process.
The model in this section is an extension of Ascari (2000) and includes a
number of features essential to understanding the impact of monetary shock
on output in a dynamic equilibrium setting. The exposition aims to outline
4the basic building blocks of the model. However, the novel aspects of this
paper only begin with the wage setting process. Firstly, we describe the
behavior of ￿rms which is standard. Then we describe the structure of the
contracts in a GTE, the wage-setting decision and monetary policy.
2.1 Firms
There is a continuum of ￿rms f 2 [0;1]; each producing a single di⁄erentiated
good Y (f), which are combined to produce a ￿nal consumption good Y: The
production function here is CES with constant returns and corresponding


























Each ￿rm f sets the price Pft and takes the ￿rm-speci￿c wage rate Wft as








Where ￿ ￿ 1 represents the degree of diminishing returns, with ￿ = 1 being
constant returns. The ￿rm chooses fPft;Yft;Lftg to maximize pro￿ts subject
to (3,4), yields the following solutions for price, output and employment at






























5where " = ￿










Price is a markup over marginal cost, which depends on the wage rate
and the output level (when ￿ < 1): output and employment depend on the
real wage and total output in the economy.
2.2 The Structure of Contracts in a GTE
In this section we outline an economy in which there are potentially many
sectors with di⁄erent types of wage-setting processes. Within each sector
there is a more or less standard Taylor process (i.e. overlapping contracts
of a speci￿ed length). The economy is called a Generalized Taylor Economy
(GTE).Corresponding to the continuum of ￿rms f there is a unit interval of
household-unions (one per ￿rm). The economy consists N sectors i = 1:::N.
The budget shares of the N sectors with uniform prices (when prices pf are
equal for all f 2 [0;1]) are given by ￿i with
PN
i=1 ￿i = 1, the N vector (￿i)
N
i=1
being denoted ￿;where ￿ 2 ￿N￿1.
We can partition the unit interval into sub-intervals representing each





with ^ ￿0 = 0 and ^ ￿N = 1. The interval for sector i is then [^ ￿i￿1; ^ ￿i].
Within each sector, each ￿rm is matched with a ￿rm-speci￿c union: there
are Ni cohorts of unions and ￿rms in sector i. Again, we can partition the
interval [^ ￿i￿1; ^ ￿i] into cohort intervals: let the share of each cohort within the
sector be ￿ij so that
PNi
j=1 ￿ij = 1, with the Ni￿vector ￿i 2 ￿Ni￿1 Again,
we can de￿ne the cumulative share ^ ￿ij analogously to ^ ￿k. The interval of
￿rm-unions corresponding to cohort j in sector i is then
h
^ ￿i￿1 + ^ ￿ij￿1￿i; ^ ￿i￿1 + ^ ￿ij￿i
i
Clearly, if symmetry is assumed (cohorts are of equal size) ￿ij = N
￿1
i and
^ ￿ij = jN
￿1
i .
The sectors are di⁄erentiated by the integer2 contract length Ti 2 Z++,
which is the same for all cohorts within a sector. The timing of the wage
2We work in discrete time in this paper, although the model obviously generalises to
continuous time.
6setting process within the sector can be summarized by an Ni ￿ 1-tuple
of integers fTijg
Ni
j=2 which speci￿es when in the wage-setting cycle cohort j
moves . It is assumed that cohort 1 moves ￿rst (period 1): this de￿nes the
beginning of the cycle, so that 1 ￿ Tij ￿ Ni. If Tij = 3, it means that
cohort j sets its wage in period 3 periods after the ￿rst. By convention, we
assume that the js are ordered so that Tij is strictly increasing. Clearly, we
have the restriction of Ni ￿ Ti: there cannot be more cohorts than contract
periods. If Ni = Ti, then one cohort moves in each period: if in addition the
the cohorts are of equal size ￿ij = N
￿1
i , we de￿ne a uniform wage setting
process in sector i. If Ni < Ti, then there will be some periods when no
cohort moves. For example, we can consider a sector with 8 period contracts
in which there are two cohorts in which the second cohort moves 4 periods
after the ￿rst, Ti2 = 4. Alternatively, there might be three cohorts, with
timing f2;6g so that the second cohort moves in period 2 and third in period
6:
In order to fully characterize the economy with non-uniform wage setting,
we also need to specify the calender date ti when the wage-setting process
starts3 for each contract length Ti. In the case of an economy with uniform
wage setting processes in all sectors, the start dates are irrelevant, since each
period is exactly the same in all sectors (i.e. the same proportion of wages
are reset).
We can therefore characterize the wage setting process in a GTE by
(T;￿) 2 ZN
++ ￿ ￿N￿1 ; which gives the contract lengths and sizes of the N
sectors, (Ni;￿i;ti) 2 Z++ ￿ ￿Ni￿1 ￿ Z++ which describes the number and
relative size of the cohorts in each sector i, and the timing/synchronization







In the case where each sector has a uniform wage setting process, we have a
uniform GTE which is more simply parameterized by (T;￿)since (Ni;￿i) =
(Ti;T
￿1
i ) and ti is irrelevant (each period looks the same). A homogenous or
simple Taylor economy is one where there is just one sector with a uniform
wage-setting process.
The general price index P can be de￿ned in terms of sectors, or subinter-
3Of course, this is not unique: all that is required for each sector is the start date of
one cycle, since then the start date of all cycles is given.












This can be further broken down into intervals for each cohort, where we
note that all ￿rms in the same cohort face the same wage and hence set the
same price pf = pij for f 2
h
















We can log linearize the price equations around the steady state , given the
wages. All ￿rms with the same wage will set the same price: de￿ne Pij as
the price set by ￿rms in sector i cohort j. This yields the following log-
linearization in terms of deviations from the steady state (where we assume







Note that there is an important property of CES technology. The demand
for an individual ￿rm depends only on its own price and the general price
index (see 3). There is no sense of location: whilst we divide the unit interval
into segments corresponding to sectors and cohorts within sectors, this need
not re￿ ect any objective factor in terms of sector or cohort speci￿c aspects
of the technology. The sole communality within a sector is the length of
the wage contract: the sole commonality within a cohort is the timing of the
contract. The vectors ￿ and ￿i are best be thought of as simply measures
of sector and cohort size. This is an important property which will become
useful when we show that a Calvo economy can be represented by a GTE.
2.2.1 Household-Unions and Wage Setting
Households h 2 [0;1] have preferences de￿ned over consumption, labour, and




















;Hht;Lht are household h0s consumption, end-of period
real money balances, hours worked, and leisure respectively, t is an index for
time, 0 < ￿ < 1 is the discount factor, and each household has the same ￿ ow
utility function u, which is assumed to take the form
U(Cht) + ￿ ln(
Mht
Pt
) + V (1 ￿ Hht) (11)
Each household-union belongs to a particular sector and wage-setting
cohort within that sector (recall, that each household is twinned with ￿rm
f = h). Since the household acts as a monopoly union, hours worked are
demand determined, being given by the (7).







t+1) ￿ Mht￿1+Bht+WhtHht+￿ht+Tht (12)
where Bh(st+1) is a one-period nominal bond that costs Q(st+1 j st) at
state st and pays o⁄ one dollar in the next period if st+1 is realized. Bht
represents the value of the household￿ s existing claims given the realized state
of nature. Mht denotes money holdings at the end of period t. Wht is the
nominal wage, ￿ht is the pro￿ts distributed by ￿rms and WhtHht is the labour
income. Finally, Tt is a nominal lump-sum transfer from the government.
The households optimization breaks down into two parts. First, there is
the choice of consumption, money balances and one-period nominal bonds to
be transferred to the next period to maximize expected lifetime utility (10)
given the budget constraint (12). The ￿rst order conditions derived from the


























Equation (13) is the Euler equation, (14) gives the gross nominal inter-
est rate and (15) gives the optimal allocation between consumption and real
9balances. Note that the index h is dropped in equations (13) and (15), which
re￿ ects our assumption of complete contingent claims markets for consump-
tion and implies that consumption is identical across all households in each
period (Cht = Ct)4:
The reset wage is for household h in sector i is chosen to maximize lifetime
utility given labour demand (7) and the additional constraint that nominal
wage will be ￿xed for Ti periods in which the aggregate output and price level
are givenfYt;Ptg. From the unions point of view, we can collect together all of

































Where Et represents the conditional expectation taken only over states of
nature in which the household is unable to reset its wage contract. Equation
(16) shows that the optimal wage is a constant "mark-up" (given by "
"￿1) over
the ratio of marginal utilities of leisure and marginal utility from consumption
within the contract duration s = t:::t + T.i ￿ 1 When Ti = 2, this equation
reduces to the ￿st order condition in Ascari (2000).
2.3 Government
There is a government conducts monetary policy via lump-sum transfer, that
is,
Tt = Mt ￿ Mt￿1 (17)
The money supply Mt grows at a rate ￿t so that Mt = ￿tMt￿1: To fo-
cus on the role of the GTE in generating the output persistence, following
Huang and Liu (2001), we assume that there are no serial correlation in the
money growth process and therefore ln(￿t) follows a white noise process, i.e.,
4See Ascari (2000).
10ln(￿t) = ￿t; where ￿t is a white noise process with a zero mean and a ￿nite
variance ￿2
￿: More speci￿cally, we assume that the money supply follows a
random walk, i.e., mt = mt￿1 + ￿t:
3 General Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize equilibrium of the economy. We ￿rst describe
the equilibrium conditions for sector i and then the equilibrium conditions
for the aggregate economy. To compute an equilibrium, we reduced the equi-
librium conditions to four equations, including the household￿ s ￿rst order
condition for setting its contract wage, the pricing equation, the household￿ s
money demand equation, and an exogenous law of motion for the growth rate
of money supply. We then log-linearize this equilibrium conditions around a
steady state. The steady state which we choose is the zero-in￿ ation steady
state, which is a standard assumption in this literature. The linearized ver-
sion of the equations are listed and discussed below. We follow the nota-
tional convention that lower-case symbols represents log-deviations of vari-
ables from the steady state.










s [pt+s + ￿yt+s]
#
(18)
The coe¢ cients on output in the wage setting equation in all sectors is given
by
￿ =
￿ll + ￿cc(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿ll
(19)
Where ￿cc = ￿UccC
Uc is the parameter governing risk aversion, ￿ll =
￿UllC
Ul
is the inverse of the labour elasticity, ￿ is the elasticity of substitution of
consumption goods.
Using equation (9) and aggregating for sector i, we get











Using equation (3) and aggregating for sector i yields
yit = ￿(pt ￿ pit) + yt (21)
Given the money demand equation (15), log-linerazing this equation yields
the following;
yt = mt ￿ pt (22)
Finally, the linearized price index in the economy is simply a weighted





3.1 Simple Taylor Economies with Price and Wage set-
ting
In this section, we examine whether our model can account for a contract
multiplier. Since the novel aspect of our paper is the incorporation of gener-
alized wage setting, it is useful to compare our results with identical models
that makes the standard assumption of a simple Taylor economy. However,
before presenting our main results by using the true parameter values, it
useful to discuss the possible outcomes of the model. We ￿rst use the values
of ￿ mentioned above for the simple Taylor case case and we then compare
our model with generalized wage setting by way of numerical simulations.
We later report our main results with true parameter values.
3.2 Calibration
The parameters of the model include the discount factor, ￿;the elasticity of
substitution of labour,￿
LL;the elasticity of substitution of consumption,￿
CC,the
elasticity of substitution of consumption goods, ￿, the monetary policy pa-
rameter, ￿t.
12The utility is additively separable and for simplicity, we assume ￿ = 1:
Empirical studies reveal that intertemporal labour supply elasticity, 1=￿
LL,
is low and is at most 1. In particular, the survey by Pencavel (1986) suggests
that ￿
LL is between 2.2 and in￿nity. Therefore, we set ￿
LL = 4:5; which
implies that intertemporal labour supply elasticity, 1=￿
LL, is 0:2: Following
Ascari (2000), we set ￿= 6: Finally, we set ￿
CC = 1 and ￿ = 1, which are
all standard values used in the literature (see for example Huang and Liu
(2002)).
Finally, we assume that at time t there is 1% shock to the distrubance
term corresponding to the money growth rate, ￿t; so that ;￿(t) = 1; and
￿(s) = 0 for all s > t:
3.2.1 The Calibration of ￿
The key parameter determining aggregate dynamics is ￿. The magnitude of ￿
is important since it governs how responsive household-unions are to current
and future changes in output (see equation 18). When there is an increase
in aggregate demand, households face higher demand for their labour and
therefore the marginal disutility of labour increases. With higher income
they consume more and marginal utility of consumption falls. The increase
combination of an increase in the marginal disutility of labour and the fall
in the marginal utility of consumption leads household-unions to increase
their wage5. The coe¢ cient ￿ determines how wages change in response to
changes in current and future output. If ￿ is large, then wages respond a
lot to changes in output which implies faster adjustments and a short-lived
response of output. On the other hand, if ￿ is small, then unions are not
sensitive to changes in current and future output. In response to an increase
in aggregate demand, the wage would not change very much and hence wages
are more rigid. In the limit, if ￿ = 0, there will be no relationship between
output and wages, so that shocks are permanent. Hence the smaller ￿, the
more rigid are wages and a smaller ￿ corresponds to a more persistent output.
Estimating ￿ as an unconstrained parameter, Taylor found that for the
US ￿ is between 0.05 and 0.1. However, in a general equilibrium framework
where we constrain ￿ to conform to micro-foundations. CKM ￿nd that with
reasonable parameter values, ￿ will be bigger than one in a staggered price
setting, whilst with staggered wage setting Ascari ￿nds the value of ￿ to be
5In the context of price-setting, the coe¢ cient re￿ ects the slope of hte marginal cost
curve.
130.2. Both CKM and Ascari argue that the microfounded value of ￿ is too high
generate observed persistence following a monetary shock which raises doubts
over the Taylor model in this respect. In a general equilibrium setting, ￿ is
determined by the fundamental parameters of the model according to (19). In
particular, its magnitude depends on the parameter governing risk aversion,
￿cc; the labour supply elasticity, ￿
￿1
ll and the elasticity of substitution of
consumption goods ￿ which determines the elasticity of ￿rm demand and the
markup from (3) and hence the markup (5).
With staggered price setting, Chari et al. (2000) ￿nd that with reasonable
parameter values, the value of ￿ is bigger than one: in particular with ￿ = 1
￿
CKM = ￿ll + ￿cc = 1:2 > 1
However, for CKM the value of ￿CKM could reasonably be much higher6: for
example with ￿ll = 4:5 and ￿cc = 1, ￿CKM = 5:5: Huang and Liu (2002)
choose to set ￿ll = 2, so that ￿CKM = 2:
As has been argued by Huang and Liu (2002) staggered price setting
underestimates the persistence of output. The value of ￿ with wage-setting








Under our preferred calibration, ￿CKM = 5:5, and 1 + ￿￿ll = 27; so that
￿Ascari = 0:2. The value of ￿ under wage setting could arguably be much
smaller: some authors set ￿ = 10 and combined with a smaller ￿ll = 2;
￿ = 1=7 = 0:14. Thus, our preferred calibration is almost the same as
Ascari, so for wage-setting we use the Ascari value of ￿ = 0:2:
The lower value of ￿ is signi￿cant and means that with staggered wages
the aggregate price level changes more slowly than with staggered prices. It
is thus inferred that staggered wage setting has greater potential to generate
persistence7. As a result, although in both mechanisms the equations are
essentially identical, they have di⁄erent implications on persistence in a gen-
eral equilibrium framework. Whilst Ascari (2000) shows that output is more
6Since CKM were aiming to show that the staggered price model did not generate
enough peristence, they chose a value of ￿CKM which was low to make the model as
persistent as it could reasonably be.
7This contradicts with the common view that both settings have similar implications
on persistence. Altough the equations are esentially the same. The the value of ￿ di⁄ers
across settings. See Huang and Liu (2002) for further discussion.
14persistent with the staggered wage setting, he shows it is still not persistent
enough to generate the observed persistence in output. Therefore, in line
with CKM, Ascari (2000) ￿nds that staggered wage setting cannot generate
enough output persistence.
Figure 1 illustrates how the magnitude of ￿ can a⁄ect the result by show-
ing the impulse responses in two di⁄erent cases. We use the value of ￿
originally used by CKM and Ascari (2000), which are ￿ = 1:22 and ￿ = 0:20
respectively. We assume as simple Taylor economy with T = 2 (wages last
6 months). All other decisions are made quarterly. We display impulse-
response of output after a one percent monetary shock. As we can see from
Figure 1, in response to the one percent monetary shock, output displays
similar patterns in the case of ￿ = 1:22 and ￿ = 0:20. For both cases, output
increases when the shock hits and quickly returns to its steady state level.
For the case of ￿ = 1:22, output returns to steady state level when unions
have had the opportunity to reset the wages. On the other hand, output is
certainly more persistent with ￿ = 0:20, but not signi￿cantly. Finally, for
the sake of comparison, we also include the impulse response of output in the
case with ￿ = 0:05 originally used by Taylor (1980), which yields a level of
persistence more in line with the evidence, but not the microfoundations.
4 Persistence in a GTE
The existing literature has tended to focus on the value ￿ in generating per-
sistence. We want to explore another dimension: for a given ￿, we allow for
di⁄erent contract lengths in the GTE framework we have developed. Having
more than one type of contract length thus is necessary if the model is to
generate output persistence beyond the initial contract period. In what fol-
lows, we show that including longer term contracts can signi￿cantly increase
persistence. Of course, this is in a sense obvious: longer contracts lead to
more persistence, and we can achieve any level of persistence if contracts
are long enough (so long as ￿ > 0). However, we want to show that even
small proportion of long-term contracts can lead to a signi￿cant increase.
Throughout this section, we will take the value of ￿ = 0:2 and explore how
persistence changes when we allow for a range of contract lengths. We do
this in three stages: ￿rst we simply illustrate our case with a simple two
sector example. Second, we use Taylor￿ s 1993 calibrated model of the US
economy allowing for contract lengths from 1-8 quarters. Lastly, we consider
15the Calvo contract process with the corresponding distribution of contract
lengths from 1 to in￿nity.
First, let us take the simple case of a two sector uniform GTE, fT;￿g =
f(2;8);(0:9;0:1)g : in sector 1 there are two period contracts, in sector 2
there are 8 period contracts: the short contract sectors produce 90% of the
economies output, the long-contracts 10%. The average contract length in
the whole economy (weighted by ￿i) is 2.6 quarters.
In Figure 2 we show both the simple Taylor economy with only 2-period
contracts alongside the GTE with 10% share of 8-period contracts. We report
the impulse response of aggregate output after a one-percent shock in money
supply as in Figure 18. As can be seen from the Figure 2, the GTE and simple
Taylor economy have dramatically di⁄erent implications for persistence. In
the simple Taylor economy with 2-quarter contracts, changes in money supply
have a potentially large but short-lived e⁄ect on output. In the GTE , the
presence of long-term contracts means that not only does aggregate output
rise following a increase in the money supply, but it is considerably fore
persistent.
4.0.2 Taylor￿ s US Economy
The main question addressed in this section is whether the GTE can ac-
count for multiplier. To calibrate the share of each sector, Ni;which can be
interpreted as the share of di⁄erent contracts, we rely on the study by (Tay-
lor (1993)), Taylor Calibrates the US economy as T = (1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8);
with sector shares being: ￿1 = 0:07; ￿2 = 0:19; ￿3 = 0:23;￿4 = 0:21;￿5 =
0:15;￿6 = 0:08;￿7 = 0:04;￿8 = 0:03: We can note that the largest sector is
3￿period contracts, the three contract lengths (3;4;5) each have about 20%,
with a fat tail of longer contracts (as many 7 and 8 quarter contracts as 1
quarter contracts).
In Figure 3, we report the response of output to innovations in monetary
shock. We ￿nd persistent response in output. In particular, the e⁄ect of a
one-percent monetary shock on output lasts roughly three years. It is evident
that incorporating generalized wage setting into a dynamic equilibrium model
has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on dynamic responses of output. The average contract
length in this economy is 3.6 periods. We compare this economy with the
corresponding simple Taylor Economy with an average contract length of 3.5
8We use Dynare to compute the impulse response functions. See Juillard (1996).
16periods.
In Figure 4 we plot the output responses for 4 di⁄erent GTEs. The
responses are normalized in the sense that the impact is set at 1. We have
the Taylor US economy as in Figure 3, we have the simple 2-period Taylor
case, the GTE with 90% 2-period and 10% 8-period contracts ,and ￿nally the
GTE with 50% 3 period and 50% 4 period contracts (which gives the average
3.5 periods which is almost the same as Taylor￿ s US economy. If we compare
Taylor￿ s US economy with the simpler economy with mean contract length
3.5, we can see that Taylor￿ s US economy is more persistent: this is because
it includes longer contracts despite having the same mean. We can also
read o⁄from Figure 4 the half lives of the impulse-response functions, which
gives us a quantitative measure of the degree of persistence. For example,
when there is simple Taylor economy with only 2-period contracts alongside
the GTE with 10% share of 8-period contracts, the half-life increases from
0.74 periods to 1.25 periods. This is also the case when we compare Taylor￿ s
US economy with the corresponding Simple Taylor Economy. In particular,
half-life increases from 3.5 periods to 4.4 periods.
5 Comparison with Calvo Economy
It has long been noted that Calvo contracts appear to be far more persistent
than Taylor contracts. In this section, we will show that if we focus on
the structure of contracts (as opposed to the wage-setting rule), the Calvo
economy is a special case of the GTE. Kiley (2002) considers a setup very
similar to ours (the main di⁄erence being that he focuses on price-setting) to
compare a simple Taylor economy with a Calvo economy. His ￿ndings are
that these two models imply very di⁄erent dynamics both qualitatively and
quantitatively. In particular, he compares a simple Taylor economy with
2 period contracts and a Calvo economy with a reset probability ! = 0:5.
He concludes that: "...Staggering imparts much less persistence than does
partial adjustment for nearly all paramtererizations..." Kiley (2002).
What we show is that Kiley is making the wrong comparison. We can
directly describe the Calvo contract structure in terms of a GTE. When we
do this, the dynamics of the Calvo economy and the corresponding GTE
are very similar (they di⁄er only because of di⁄erent wage-setting behavior).
Indeed, the main reason for Kiley￿ s conclusion is that he is not comparing
like with like. The Taylor economy is described in terms of the distribution of
17completed contract lengths: the average completed contract in Calvo economy
is 2
! ￿ 1, which is almost twice the length of the expected contract duration
(1=!). Hence, we ￿nd that Kiley compares a Calvo economy with ! = 0:5
which implies an average contract length of 3 periods with a 2-period Taylor
contract. If we compare Calvo ! = 0:5 with a Taylor economy with 3-period
contracts, the persistence properties of the Calvo and Taylor are similar9.
5.0.3 Calvo contracts as a special case of a GTE
Two main features of the Calvo setup stand out as di⁄erent form the standard
Taylor setup. First its "stochastic" nature: at the ￿rm level, the length of the
wage contract is random; second, that the model is described in terms of the
"age" of contracts (which includes uncompleted durations) and the hazard
rate (the reset probability !). The second feature is easy to remedy: we can
look at either Taylor or Calvo contracts and describe them in terms of either
the distribution of completed contract durations (lifespans) or in terms of
the distribution of ages all durations (complete and incomplete): it is simply
two ways of describing the same process. On the ￿rst issue. the stochastic
nature of the Calvo model at the ￿rm level does a⁄ect the wage setting
decision. However, apart form the wage setting decision we can describe the
Calvo process in deterministic terms at the aggregate level because the ￿rm
level randomness washes out. At the aggregate level, the precise identity of
individual ￿rms does not matter: what matters is population demographics
in terms of proportions of ￿rms setting contracts of particular lengths at
particular times. Because there is a continuum of ￿rms, the behavior of
contracts at the aggregate level can be seen as a purely deterministic process.
First, we set aside the precise level of wages and observe the duration of
wages. We focus on the "demographics" of the contract lengths in a Calvo
process10. If we take a snapshot of the economy in period t we will observe a
proportion ! of wages changing of the remaining (1￿!) ￿rm/unions do not.
We observe the distribution of durations: a proportion !(1￿!)s￿1 have been
been in place for s periods. These are non-completed durations for (1 ￿ !)
9See Dixon and Kara (2004)
10For a discussion of "life span" and "age", in the unemployment duration literature,
see Salant (1977), Carlson and Horrigan (1983). These studies present some examples and
show that E [T j s] = 2!￿1: However, in discrete time speci￿cation needs to be a small
adjustment in this formula, as pointed out by Carlson and Horrigan (1983) (cf. Luckett
(1979))
18￿rms. The expected completed duration T for a contract that has survived
for s periods is E [T j s] = s + !￿1 for all s ￿ 0 (the since the hazard rate !
is constant).
The steady-state cross-section of contract ages can be described by the
proportions ￿s
i of ￿rms surviving at least s periods:
￿
s
i = ! (1 ￿ !)
i￿1 : i = 1::1 (24)
with mean ￿ s = !￿1. In demographic terms, s is the age of the contract:
￿s
i is the proportion of the population of age s; ￿ s is the average age of the
population.





with mean ￿ T = 2￿!
! . In demographic terms, T gives the distribution of ages
at death (for example as reported by the registrar of deaths): ￿i being the
proportion of the steady state population who will live to die at age T.
Assuming that we are in steady state (which is implicit in the use of the
Calvo model), we can assume that there are in fact ex ante ￿xed contract
lengths. We can classify ￿rms/unions by the duration of their "contract".
The fact that the contract length of a ￿rm/union is ￿xed is perfectly compat-
ible with the notion of a reset probability if we assume that the ￿rm does not
know the contract length. We can think of the ￿rm-union having a proba-
bility distribution over contract lengths given by ￿s
i in (24): Nature chooses
the contract length, but the ￿rm-unions do not know when they have to set
the price (when the contract begins).
Having rede￿ned the Calvo economy in terms of completed contract
lengths, we can now describe it as a GTE. There are an in￿nite number
of sectors, each strictly positive integer corresponding to a contract length:
N = 1 Ti = i;i = 1:::1
The proportions of each completed contract length are given by (25):The
wage setting process in each sector is uniform: there are T
￿1







11See Dixon and Kara (2004), Proposition 1.
19Let us just check that this will yield a contract structure equivalent to the
Calvo process. Since the wage setting process is uniform, we can consider the
representative period. In the sector with Ti period contracts, a proportion
￿i=Ti contracts come to an end. Hence, using (25) and summing across all
sectors the total measure of all contracts in the economy coming to an end









2 (1 ￿ !)
i￿1 = !
As in the Calvo process, in the Calvo-GTE a proportion ! of the population
comes to the end of a contract. If we look at this Calvo-GTE, the average
observed duration of contacts (completed and non-completed) will be !￿1.
To see why, let us derive the average age from the distribution of contract
lengths. The proportion of contracts age i is obtained by summing across
all cohorts who reset wages i periods ago. Clearly, this means we sum only
















= ! (1 ￿ !)
i￿1
Hence, as in Calvo, the average age of contracts in a Calvo-GTE is !￿1. So,
the average age of a contract in steady-state cross-section is !￿1, and the
average age of completed contracts is 2!￿1￿1. This is because in a uniform
wage process, on average each contract will be about half way through. In
continuous time they would be exactly half way through: but because of
the measurement of time in integers, it is not quite so: the average age is
more than half completed contract length: in fact it is 0:5 more12. Thus for
example, if we measure the average age of two period contracts in a uniform
simple Taylor setting, the average age is 1:5 = 1+2









20continuous time. Hence the completed contract length is a little less than
twice the age13.
5.0.4 Pricing in the Calvo-GTE.
We have de￿ned the Calvo-GTE in terms of the structure of completed con-
tract lengths. The only di⁄erence between the Calvo economy and the
Calvo-GTE is in the pricing decision. In the Calvo economy, the ￿rm is un-
certain of the contract length: the pricing decision must be made "ex ante",
that is before the ￿rm knows which length nature has choosen. This yields
the standard Calvo pricing decision. Once the price is set, the ￿rm ￿nds
out its contract length in due course14. By contrast, in the Calvo-GTE, the
￿rm-unions know which sector they belong to when they set the wage. This
has two implications. First, whereas in the Calvo process, all ￿rm-unions
will set the same price (since they have the same subjective probability dis-
tribution over durations), in the Taylor equivalent the ￿rms-unions set a
price conditional on the contract length. Hence, wages in each sector of the
Calvo-GTE will be di⁄erent. Taking the simple case of ￿ = 1, from (18) the
reset wage in sector i with a Ti contract is then the average "optimal" price













2 (1 ￿ !)
s￿1 (pt+s + ￿yt+s)
Clearly, the mean reset wage in the Calvo-GTE is equal to the standard
Calvo reset wage. In the Calvo-GTE, there is a distribution of sector speci￿c
reset wages xit in each period. Hence, in addition to the distribution of
prices across cohorts (de￿ned by when they last reset prices) in the Calvo
model, the GTE has a distribution across sectors within the cohort, but with
same mean.
13See Luckett (1979).
14It does not matter when: either straight after the pricing decision or at the last moment
when it gets the Calvo phone call that it is time to reset the wage.
215.0.5 Persistence in the Calvo and Calvo-GTE compared.
We now compare the Calvo-GTE and the standard Calvo economy. In the-
ory, the Calvo-GTE and the Calvo economy are exactly the same except for
the pricing decision. However, for computational purposes whilst the Calvo
economy e⁄ectively has an in￿nite lag structure (via the Koyck transform),
the Calvo-GTE has to be truncated. Hence we also introduce a Calvo-
Calvo-GTE: that is the GTE with the same contract structure and pricing
rule as the Calvo model, but truncated as in the Calvo-GTE. For the sim-
ulations, we truncated the distribution of contract lengths to 20 quarters
T = 1;:::20. with the 20 period contracts absorbing all of the weight from
the longer contracts. When we apply the standard Calvo pricing rule to
this truncated distribution, it yields a perceptible but negligible di⁄erence;
hence all of the visually apparent di⁄erences between the Calvo-GTE and
the standard Calvo model are due almost entirely to the di⁄erence in pricing
behaviour.
In Figure 5 we compare the impulse response for the Calvo-GTE which
has the same distribution of completed contract lengths as the Calvo dis-
tribution, with the standard Calvo economy for ! = 0:25. We ￿nd that
Calvo-GTE has almost exactly the same persistence as the Calvo economy.
The e⁄ect is as little larger for 5 quarters and a little less subsequently. We
also show the standard Taylor economy with the same mean contract length
￿ T = 7: Although the e⁄ect is a greater for the ￿rst 5 quarters, the e⁄ect dies
down and is signi￿cantly less thereafter. This re￿ ects the fact that although
the mean contract lengths are the same, the longer contracts in the Calvo
and Calvo-GTE generate the extra persistence.
For comparison, Figure 6 shows the distributions of fractions of contracts
for three di⁄erent speci￿cations; Calvo-GTE, the Taylor 1993 calibration
of the US economy, and Calvo distribution of all durations (complete and
incomplete).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a general framework, the GTE which uni￿es
the previously disparate approaches of modelling dynamic price and wage
setting: Calvo and Taylor. The approach is a generalization of the simple
Taylor model to take into account the presence of a range of di⁄erent contract
22lengths. We use this approach to focus on the e⁄ect of the presence longer
term contracts on the persistence of impulse-response functions generated by
a monetary shock. Our conclusions are the following:
￿ A small proportion of long-term contracts can generate a signi￿cant
increase in persistence.
￿ The average length of contracts in the Calvo model has been seriously
underestimated, because the age and life-time of contracts have been
confused. If modelers want an average contract length of 4-quarters,
they should choose a reset probability of ! = 0:4: The often used value
of 0:25 generates an average contract length of 7 quarters.
￿ When we compare the standard Calvo model with the corresponding
Calvo-GTE, we ￿nd that although the wage-setting behavior di⁄ers,
the persistence of the two is very similar.
￿ In general, if we want to model an economy with many di⁄erent con-
tract lengths using a simple Taylor economy, we should choose a con-
tract length which is greater than the average. This is becuase the
presence of contracts with longer duration leads to more persistence
despite having a similar mean.
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